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shipper from setting off damages of shipment against freight
charges." If in an action by the carriers for charges, a shipper can-
not counterclaim for a cause of action ordinarily pleadable as such,
then as a corollary, in an action by the shipper the carrier should not
be permitted to counterclaim. There is no ground for differentiating
or for treating suits by one wherein the other counterclaims as pre-
sumptively collusive.' 2 It must be assumed that, when litigants come
into a court, they are submitting a real controversy for settlement.'2
Adjustments of demands by counterclaims rather than by independent
suit serves to avoid circuity of action and is encouraged by law. 14
Commendable economy and efficiency in judicial procedure would,
seem to justify the disposition of the entire related controversy in one
action.' 5
G. A. LONG.
Conflict of Laws-Death by Wrongful Act-Limitations on
Right of Action
Under the Florida laws, an action for damages for wrongful
death may be brought at any time within two years after the death
occurred.' The North Carolina wrongful death statute2 specifies that
the action must be brought within one year. More than one year, but
less than two years, after a cause of action accrued in Florida, suit
was instituted in North Carolina. Held, action barred.8
When common law actions are involved, the general rule is that
the law of the place governs the right, and the law of the forum
governs the remedy.4 Since general statutes of limitation are pro-
cedural in nature, it follows that the limitation of common law ac-
tions is governed by the lex fori.5 Thus, if action is barred by the
statute of limitations of the forum, no action can be maintained
'Battle v. Atkinson, 9 Ga. App. 488, 71 S. E. 775 (1911) ; Pennsylvania R
Co. v. Bellinger, 101 Misc. Rep. 105, 166 N. Y. S. 652 (1917).
'Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. E. C. Tecktonius Mfg. Co. 262 Fed. 715 (E.
D. Wis. 1920).
' Wells Fargo & Co. v. Cuneo, 241 Fed. 727 (S. D. N. Y. 1917).
" North Chicago Rolling Mill Co. v. St. Louis Ore & Steel Co., 152 U. S.
596, 615-616, 14 Sup. -Ct. 710, 715-716, 38 L. ed. 565 (1894).
"Payne, Director General v. Clark, 271 Fed. 525 (S. D. Cal. 1921).
'FLA. REV. GEN. STAT. (1920), §§4960-61, 2930 (6).
'N. C. CoNs. STAT. ANN. (1919), §160.
1Tieffenbrun v. Flannery, 198 N. C. 397, 151 S. E. 857 (1930).
" Scudder v. Union Nat. Bank, 91 U. S. 406, 23 L. ed. 245 (1875) ; 1 Woon,
LImITATioNs (4th ed. 1916) 62.
'McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312, 10 L. ed. 177 (1839) ; Patton v. Lumber
Co., 171 N. C. 837, 73 S. E. 167 (1916) ; Note (1900) 48 L. R. A. 625.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
though the action is not barred in the state in which the cause of
action arose. 6  Conversely, if an action is not barred by the lex fori,
it may be maintained though it is barred by the lex loci delicti.
7
The right of action for damages for wrongful death is unknown
to the common law. 8 When the statute which creates the right speci-
fies the time in which action must be brought, this limitation is a con-
dition annexed to the right,9 and, like other substantive matters,10
is governed by the law of the place of the wrong. Consequently, no
state will allow recovery on the statute after the limitation has
elapsed." The same result has been reached, moreover, when the
limitation was not incorporated in the same statute which created the
cause of action for wrongful death, but was directed expressly to that
cause of action.12
On the theory, that when such prescribed limitation has expired,
the cause of action is extinguished, recovery has been denied where
suit was brought after the time provided Iiy the lex loci delicti but
within the time required for bringing action on a similar cause of
'CoNFLIcr oF LAWS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1929) §631. See McCoy
v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 134 Mo. 622, 627, 114 S. W. 1124 (1909). But see
Note (1913) 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 687, 690.
' CONFLICt or LAWS REsTATEmENT, supra note 6, §632; O'Shields v. Ga. Pac.
Ry., 83 Ga. 621, 10 S. E. 268, 6 L. R. A. 152 (1889) ; Tarbell v. Grand Trunk
Ry. Co., 94 Vt. 449, 111 Atl. 567 (1920). But where title to a chattel has been
acquired by adverse possession under the law of the situs, the rights acquired
will be respected in another jurisdiction to Which the chattel has been subse-
quently removed, although the statute of limitations of the forum would not
have barred the original owner's action. Shelby v. Guy, 11 Wheat. 361, 6 L. ed.
495 (1826).
'It was not until the enactment, in 1876, of Lord Campbell's Act that recog-
nition was given to the doctrine that "it is oftentimes right and expedient that
the wrongdoer in such cases should be answerable in damages" for the death so
caused by him. (9 & 10 Vict. c. 93.)
'2 WHARToN, CONFLicT oF LAWS (3rd. ed. 1905) 1261; Taylor v. Cranberry
Iron Co., 94 N. C. 525 (1886) ; Hanie v. Penland, 193 N. C. 800, 138 S. E. 165
(1927). See also Engel v. Davenport, 271 U. S. 33, 46 S. Ct. 410, 70 L. ed. 813
(1926) (the time provision in a Federal Employers' Liability Act is substantive,
and the shorter period prescribed by a state limitation statute will not prevail).
"Wrongful death statutes usually specify the party who must bring suit.
See Notes (1926) 24 MicH. L. REv. 411; (1928) 37 YAL.E L. J. 666; (1923) 9
VA. L. REv. 567.
'The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199, 75 Sup. Ct. 140, 30 L. ed. 358 (1886);
Boyd v. Clark, 8 Fed. 849 (E. D. Mich. 1881); CoNFLICT oF LAWS RESTATE-
izENT, supra note 7, §433. See Note (1900) 48 L. R. A. 639.
' Negaubauer v. Gt. Northern Ry., 92 Minn. 184, 99 N. W. 620, 104 Am.
St. Rep. 674, 2 Ann. Cas. 150 (1900). See also, Brunswick Terminal Co. v.
National Bank, 99 Fed. 635, 48 L. R. A. 625 (C. C. A. 4th, 1900); Davis v.
Mills, 194 U. S. 451, 24 Sup. Ct. 692, 48 L. ed. 1067 (1904). But see Gregory
v. Sou. Pac. Co., 157 Fed. 113 (C. C. D. Ore. 1907) (Wrongful death statute
contained no limitation, and general limitation statutes of locus delicti made
no reference to this cause of action, held, lex fori will govern.); Munos v.
Southern Pac. Ry., 51 Fed. 188 (C. C. A. 5th, 1892).
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action arising within the forum.'8 But as to the reverse situation,
where suit is brought within the time provided by the lex loci delicti
but after the time required by the lex fori, the authorities are sharply
divided. 14
The determinative question in situations of this type is whether
the time limit contained in the siatute of the forum is, in reality, both
a statute of lfmitation and a condition annexed to the substantive
right.15 Minnesota has held that the limitation is substantive only
and, applying the general rule that the law of the state creating the
right governs, has allowed action on a foreign wrongful death statute
to be maintained even though the same action would have been barred
had the wrong occurred in the state of the forum.10 There are Fed-
eral Court decisions in accord. 17
A contrary result was reached by the North Carolina court when
the question was fairly presented by the principal case. If the North
Carolina statute is substantive only, and not a statute of limitation, it
inevitably follows that the one year limit contained therein is in-
tended to govern actions for wrongful deaths occurring in North
Carolina, and has no effect on admittedly, good, transitory' 8 causes
of action arising in other states and brought to the forum for trial.
However, the declaration of the court that the time limit in the statute
is both a condition annexed to the cause of action and a legislative
declaration of the policy of the state as to when wrongful death
actions shall be asserted in the state, is sound, is in accord with the
suggestion made in the American Law Institute's Restatement of
Conflict of Laws,'9 and will doubtless point the way for other de-
cisions in this disputed area of the law.
THOMAS W. SPRINKLE.
"Wingert v. Carpenter, 101 Mich. 395, 59 N. W. 662 (1894); Ry. Co. v.
Lacy, 49 Ga. 107 (1873).142 WHARTON, supra note 9, 1264.
"See GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1927) 171.
" Negaubauer v. Gt. Northern Ry Co., supra note 12.
" Keep v. National Tube Co., 154 Fed. 121 (D. N. D. 1907); Theroux v,
Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 64 Fed. 84 (C. C. A. 8th, 1894)
'Dennick v. Railroad, 103 U. S. 11, 26 L. ed. 439 (1880); Harrell v.
South Carolina, etc. R. Co., 132 N. C. 655, 44 S. E. 109 (1903). But see
McLay v. Slade, 48 R. I. 357, 138 Atl. 212 (1927), Noted (1927) 26 MICH.
L. REv. 325. (When the death statute is penal, there can be no recovery in
another state.)
CoNtLiCr OF LAws RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1928) §433, comment(b), "The limit of time in the death statute of the forum may be interpreted
as a statute of limitations for actions for death; and in that case the suit
must be brought within the time limited in that statute, as well as within the
time limited in the statute of -the place of injury."
